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R&D cooperation is reconsidered in situations where ￿rms direct
R&D activities towards a new product that cannibalizes the ￿rms￿
existing products. For soft cannibalization, the welfare-maximizing
arrangement between ￿rms involves, for low R&D costs, the formation
of a separate entity that independently chooses both the output level of
t h en e wg o o da n dt h el e v e lo fR & De x p e n d i t u r e sa n do t h e r w i s e ,j o i n t
decisions about R&D but independent decisions about production.
Yet, as cannibalization increases, ￿rms ￿nd it unpro￿table to market
the new good unless they collaborate more narrowly. Merger should
then be permitted for the socially desirable introduction of the new
good.
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Over the last decade, an abundant literature has investigated the issue of
cooperative versus non-cooperative Research and Development (R&D) in
oligopolistic industries. This literature starts from the observation that dif-
ferent aspects of R&D generate incentives for ￿rms to behave strategically,
and thereby entail a spread between private and social incentives to conduct
R&D. Major recent contributions have examined the question of whether
R & Dc o o p e r a t i o nc a nb ea ne ﬀective means to eliminate or reduce such
spread.1 They have highlighted the primary bene￿t and disadvantage of
R&D cooperation in the presence of positive spillovers. One the one hand,
by internalizing spillovers across ￿rms, R&D cooperation may raise the in-
centive to conduct R&D and hence the total amount of R&D. On the other
hand, when the ￿rms conducting R&D are rivals on the product market, they
realize that their R&D investment makes their rivals tougher competitors;
in this case, the eﬀect of R&D cooperation may be to reduce the incentive
to conduct R&D. The total eﬀe c th a sb e e ns h o w nt od e p e n do nt h ed e g r e e
of knowledge spillover between the ￿rms and on the costs of R&D activities.
For instance, it is established that when spillovers are suﬃciently large, R&D
cooperation (with subsequent competition at the output stage) leads to more
output, R&D, and welfare than non-cooperation.
This literature considers that ￿rms conduct R&D because it can generate
the knowledge to produce existing products at lower costs or to produce new
products. In the latter case, it is generally assumed that the new products
are independent of any other products the ￿rms are currently producing. In
a number of situations, however, such assumption seems rather restrictive:
it is indeed often the case that new products combine the characteristics of
existing products and appear thus as substitutes for these existing products.
In other words, the introduction of the new product by parent ￿rms might
come at the expense of the sales of the parents￿ existing products, a phe-
nomenon known as cannibalization. The following two stories illustrate this
point.
￿ In May 1999, Eastman Kodak Co. (Kodak) announced the centerpiece
of its new ￿digital strategy￿, a joint venture with America Online Inc
1See, e.g., d￿Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Katz and Ordover (1990), Kamien,
Muller and Zang (1992), Suzumura (1992), De Bondt, Slaets, and Cassiman (1992), Ben-
sa￿d, Encaoua, and Winckler (1994), Leahy and Neary (1997).
1(AOL), called ￿You￿ve Got Pictures!￿. The aim of the joint venture is
to allow consumers to drop Kodak 35mm ￿lm oﬀ at the drugstore and
have a roll of 24 pictures digitally scanned and uploaded into their AOL
accounts. From there, consumers will be able to E-mail the images to
friends, order reprints or gifts, or download high-resolution copies that
can be edited on a PC. Kodak and AOL said they will make joint
investments in advertising and marketing, product development, and
ongoing support. The two companies will share in revenues from the
venture. Though commentators agree that it was critical for Kodak to
extend its name to digital since the technology represents a long-term
threat to its core franchise in 35mm ￿lm2,i tt o o kq u i t eal o n gt i m e
for Kodak￿s decision to take shape. As a Kodak￿s oﬃcial acknowledged
it back in 1997, ￿Kodak has taken care that its new digital products
encroach as little as possible on its ￿lm business. (...) There is no doubt
about the quality of Kodak￿s technology but the fear of cannibalization
always slowed things down.￿3
￿ In its most basic form, Internet-on-TV displays on television some of
t h es a m es e r v i c e s( t h eW e ba n de - m a i l )n o wa v a i l a b l et oP Cu s e r s .
Yet the long-term future of the Internet-on-TV market lies more in
using Internet technologies cost-eﬀectively to support and supplement
what TV viewers do today￿watch television￿not just bring existing
PC-oriented Internet content and services to viewers through their tele-
vision monitor. Analysts of the Internet-on-TV arena underline three
major trends. First, by combining standards and technologies from
computing, consumer electronics, and telephony, Internet-on-TV is fer-
tile ground for innovative applications. Second, alliance and acquisition
will characterize the near future in this market as participants partner
to share development costs, overcome marketing weakness, gain ac-
cess to content and broadband networks, and spread technology and
investment risks. Third, Internet-on-TV threatens to draw customers
away from today￿s Internet service providers (ISP), which are among
the major players on the market.￿An ISP can preempt such damage by
launching its own Internet-on-TV service, but it must diﬀerentiate its
2Businessweek Online (August 2, 1999), at http://www.businessweek.com/1999/99/31/
b3640098.htm.
3D. Strickland (Kodak￿s former vice-president for software) in ￿Can George Fisher Fix
Kodak?￿, Business Week Magazine (October 20, 1997).
2new TV-based oﬀering from that of its computer-targeted service or risk
slicing into the revenues it now collects from PC-based customers.￿4
When ￿rms conduct R&D to produce a new product that directly com-
petes with their existing products, the issue of non-cooperative versus coop-
erative R&D encompasses three additional features. First, R&D activities
have to be appreciated for their eﬀects on the competition not only on the
￿new￿ market, but also on the ￿old￿ markets. Next, in a similar vein, the
￿rms￿ individual rationality for engaging in R&D and production of the new
product has to be carefully checked: pro￿ts on the new product market must
cover not only R&D expenditures but also pro￿ts lost on the ￿old￿ markets.
Finally, since the ￿rms can be active on diﬀerent markets, a wider range of
cooperation modes opens for them; that is, ￿rms can choose to take inde-
pendently or jointly their decisions regarding R&D and/or production of the
new good and/or production of the existing goods.
The aim of the present paper is to address these three additional features
within an analytical model. In order to keep the model tractable, the analysis
is limited to a symmetric two-￿rm setting with full knowledge spillovers,
and with linear demands and marginal costs. Despite its simplicity, several
important points emerge.
1. The presence of cannibalization does not challenge the d￿Aspremont
and Jacquemin (1988) result according to which cooperation on R&D
is welfare-improving when spillovers are suﬃciently large. We indeed
show that none of the arrangements involving uncoordinated R&D ac-
tivities will ever be chosen either by the ￿rms or by a regulator willing
to maximize social welfare.
2. When cannibalization is not too strong, social welfare is maximized, for
high R&D costs, when ￿rms form a R & DC a r t e l( R D C )and, for low
R&D costs, when they form an Independent Joint Venture (IJV).I n
the RDC option, ￿rms coordinate their R&D decisions in the ￿rst stage
to maximize combined industry pro￿ts but still act independently in
the second (production) stage; in the IJV option, a new ￿rm is set
up which independently chooses the second-stage output level of the
4See ￿Internet on Television￿, Media Futures Program, SRI Consulting (June 1998) at
http://future.sri.com:8080/dv3adm/iTV.
3new good, and which chooses the ￿rst-stage expenditures of R&D that
maximize its own pro￿t.
3. When cannibalization is strong, ￿rms might ￿nd it unpro￿table to mar-
ket the new good unless they are allowed to narrowly collaborate with
each other; at the limit, a complete merger will be the only option
under which the new good will appear.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
various collaborative agreements that the ￿rms may adopt, as well as the
main assumptions of the modeling framework. Section 3 solves the two-stage
games corresponding to the various options. Section 4 compare the solutions
in terms of ￿rms￿ pro￿ts, consumers surplus and social welfare. Section 5
concludes.
2T h e m o d e l s
We consider an industry where two ￿rms act initially as local monopolists
on their respective market (￿rms 1 and 2 respectively produce goods X and
Y which are perfectly diﬀerentiated). Let us suppose that, at some point in
time, both ￿rms have the opportunity to start marketing a new good (noted
Z) that is substitutable to the existing goods X and Y . There exists for good
Z some process innovation that requires two complementary and speci￿c
assets. Suppose also that these assets are costly to develop and that none
of the ￿rms owns both of the assets simultaneously. In order to obtain the
bene￿ts of the process innovation, ￿rms therefore have to collaborate in some
way or another. Diﬀerent options are open to them according to whether they
choose to coordinate their R&D decisions (i.e., the amounts of speci￿c assets
they invest) and/or their production decisions (i.e., the quantities of the new
good and of the existing goods they put on the market). More speci￿cally,
we consider the following six options. In each option, a two-stage game takes
place where R&D decisions precede production decisions.
1. The ￿rst option is to form a Technology Sharing Cartel (TSC) in which
￿rms agree ex ante to share technological knowledge resulting from R&D
activities. Aside from that, there is no other form of cooperation be-
tween ￿rms: each ￿rm independently chooses its R&D investment and
its output level for the new good, as well as for its existing (￿old￿) good.
42. The second option goes a step further by introducing cooperation in the
joint development of R&D projects.T h a ti s ,￿rms coordinate their R&D
decisions in the ￿rst stage to maximize combined industry pro￿ts but
still act independently in the second (production) stage. To conform
to the literature, we say in this case that ￿rms create a R&D Cartel
(RDC).
3. The third option also goes a step further with respect to the ￿rst option,
but by introducing cooperation in the production of the new good rather
than in R&D decisions. Firms create here a Production Joint Venture
(PJV) which chooses the second-stage output level of the new good,
independently of the parent ￿rms. As for the parent ￿rms, they non-
cooperatively choose the output levels of their old good at the second
stage, and their R&D investment at the ￿rst stage of the game.
4. In the fourth and ￿fth options, a new ￿rm is set up which, as the PJV,
independently chooses the second-stage output level of the new good.
Furthermore, these two options also involve some form of cooperation
in R&D decisions:
(a) in the Cooperative Joint Venture (CJV) option, the parent ￿rms
coordinate their R&D investments in order to maximize combined
industry pro￿ts (as in the RDC option);5
(b) on the other hand, in the Independent Joint Venture (IJV) option,
it is the new ￿rm that bears the cost of the speci￿ca s s e t sa n d
chooses the level of assets that maximizes its own pro￿t.
5We coined the term ￿Cooperative Joint venture￿ to indicate that a joint venture is
set up as a separate entity, and that there exists some cooperation between the parent
companies as far as R&D is concerned. It must be noted, however, that the EC competition
law gives to this term a speci￿c meaning, which diﬀers from the one we use here. Under the
EC Merger Regulation, ￿cooperative￿ joint ventures are distinguished from ￿concentrative￿
joint ventures. The latter are de￿ned by two criteria: ￿rst, the joint venture must perform
on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous entity; second, there must be no
coordination of competitive behavior of the partiesamongst themselves or between them
and the joint venture (Article 3 (2)). Any joint venture which does not satisfy these
two requirements is considered as cooperative. Note that because the distinction between
t h et w ot y p e so fj o i n tv e n t u r e sh a sp r o v e nt ob eo n eo ft h em o s td i ﬃcult issues in the
implementation of the Merger Regulation, a 1998 Notice on ￿the concept of Full-Function
































Figure 1: Alternative arrangements
5. Finally, total cooperation is reached in the Merger (MER) option,
where ￿rms decide to form a single entity which chooses R&D invest-
ments in the ￿rst stage and output levels of all goods in the second
stage to maximize total industry pro￿ts.
To sum up, the six options are as follows (see Figure 1 for a schematic
representation). Either parent ￿rms decide to produce separately the new
good and three options are open: (i) no cooperation (Technology Sharing
Cartel) ,( i i )c o o p e r a t i o ni nR & D( R&D Cartel), or (iii) cooperation in both
R&D and production of all three goods (Merger). Or parent ￿rms delegate
the production of the new good to a new entity (a Joint Venture) and, again,
three options are open regarding R&D decisions: either R&D decisions are
also delegated to the new entity (Independent Joint Venture), or they are
left to parent ￿rms which can then act non-cooperatively (Production Joint
Venture)o rc o o p e r a t e l y( Cooperative Joint Venture).
Our goal is to compare the respective performance of the six options
with respect to output, R&D, industry pro￿ts, consumers surplus and social
welfare. As will become clear below, such comprehensive comparison seems
hardly tractable without selecting some speci￿c model. The six options in-
deed involve a series of eﬀects that aﬀect diﬀerently ￿rms and consumers
and that cannot be balanced a priori. More precisely, complementary R&D
activities and substitutability of the products create three types of external-
ities.
6￿ First, because of knowledge spillovers, there is a free-riding eﬀect when
R&D levels are chosen independently by the two ￿rms; each ￿rm tries to
free-ride on the eﬀorts of its rival by lowering the level of its own speci￿c
and costly assets. Underprovision of R&D is likely to have a negative
eﬀect on consumers surplus and an ambiguous eﬀect on industry pro￿ts.
￿ Second, production of the new good within a single ￿rm entails two
contrasting eﬀects. On the one hand, it removes competition on this
market, which tends to increase ￿rms pro￿ts but to reduce consumers
surplus (cartelization eﬀect). On the other hand, independent produc-
tion of the new good entails a cannibalization eﬀect on the sales of the
existing goods; this eﬀect is detrimental to ￿rms pro￿ts but bene￿cial
to consumers surplus.
Table 1 highlights which of the three eﬀects occur in each of the six
options.
Free riding Cartelization Cannibalization
TSC Yes No No
RDC No No No
MER No Yes No
PJV Yes Yes Yes
CJV No Yes Yes
IJV No Yes Yes
Table 1: Presence of externalities in the various options
The balance between these various eﬀects will depend on three key pa-
rameters: the degree of knowledge spillovers, the cost of R&D, and the degree
of cannibalization between new and old goods. In what follows, we somehow
simplify the analysis by assuming that the spillovers of the R&D bene￿ts be-
tween the ￿rms reach their maximum level. This simpli￿cation allows us to
focus on the interplay between the costs of R&D activities and the intensity
of cannibalization. Speci￿cally, we make the following set of assumptions.
(A1) Let goods X, Y and Z be produced in respective quantities x, y and z,
and sold at respective prices p, q and r. Demands for the three goods
7are derived from the following quadratic utility of a representative con-
sumer:






2) − γ(x + y)z, (1)
where γ ∈ [0,1] measures the degree of substitutability between the new
good Z and the old goods X and Y (for γ =0 , Z is independent of X
and Y ;f o rγ =1 ,i ti sap e r f e c ts u b s t i t u t e ) . 6 Maximizing utility subject
to the budget constraint yields the following linear inverse demand




p = α − x − γz,
q = α − y − γz,
r = α − z − γ(x + y).
(2)
Note that z represents total quantity of the new good; in particular,
when ￿rms 1 and 2 produce separately good Z (i.e., in options TSC
and RDC), we have z ≡ z1 + z2.
(A2) Let a1 and a2 denote the amount of the two assets respectively chosen
by ￿rms 1 and 2. We de￿ne the marginal cost of production of the new
product as cz = c − a1 − a2 (with 0 <c<α); this formulation empha-
sizes that spillovers are complete (since marginal cost of production is
reduced by the sum of both R&D eﬀorts).
(A3) Let c also measure the marginal cost of production of the two existing
goods (meaning that, before any process innovation,a l lt h r e eg o o d s
have the same marginal cost of production).7
(A4) Monetary expenses incurred to obtain a level of speci￿ca s s e t sai are
given by (s/2)a2
i; such quadratic costs re￿ect the existence of dimin-
ishing returns to R&D expenditures; parameter s measures the cost of
development of the ￿rms￿ speci￿ca s s e t s .
We are now in a position to solve the two-stage games corresponding to
each of the six options and to compare their welfare eﬀects.
6Parent ￿rms are thus in a symmetric position in terms of cannibalization. Section 5
discusses the eﬀects of relaxing this assumption.
7This assumption is made for technical convenience. Assuming diﬀerent marginal costs
of production would signi￿cantly complicate the analysis without any real gain in insight
(we would just have to express additional conditions to ensure that second-order conditions
are satis￿ed and that equilibrium solutions are interior).
83 Resolution of models
As a preliminary step, we need to compute the pro￿t levels that ￿rms 1 and 2
can achieve when the new good is not produced (and no R&D is performed).
Firms 1 and 2 act thus as local monopolists. With z = a1 = a2 =0 ,o n e
easily exploit the symmetry of the model to derive the following equilibrium
quantities and pro￿ts:







2 ≡ Π0. (3)
Expression (3) can be interpreted as the reservation pro￿t level each ￿rm
must obtain for accepting to enter into some form of cooperative agreement
for the production of good Z;i no t h e rw o r d s ,
Π
i ≥ Π0 (i =1 ,2)
expresses the participation constraint for ￿rm i in each of the six options.

















In a similar vein, expression (5) can be interpreted as a ￿reservation social
welfare level￿ under which the introduction of the new good would be detri-
mental to society.
We can now turn to the resolution of the six two-stage games. We ￿rst
describe the diﬀerent maximization programs for the two stages in each of the
six options; to facilitate the exposition, we distinguish the options according
to whether the new good is produced by separate entities or by a single
entity; the Merger option is treated separately. All equilibrium asset and
output levels are presented in a synthetic table in Appendix A.
3.1 Separate production of the new good (TSC, RDC)
When ￿rms 1 and 2 form either a Technology Sharing Cartel (option TSC)
or a R&D Cartel (option RDC), they produce each a quantity zi of good Z.
The second (production) stage is the same in the two games. Firm 1 faces
9the following maximization programs (where superscript K is equal to either
T or R to denote, respectively, options TDC and RDC, and where β ≡ α−c





1 [x,y,z1,z 2,a 1,a 2]=( p − c)x +[ r − (c − a1 − a2)]z1
=[ β − x − γ(z1 + z2)]x +
[β + a1 + a2 − z1 − z2 − γ (x + y)]z1.
Firm 2 faces a similar program. Solving for the system of four ￿rst-order
conditions, one derives the output equilibria for any given levels of the assets
a1 and a2. Using these output equilibria, we can write the second stage













2 (a1,a 2),a 1,a 2
⁄
.
The two options diﬀer with respect to the ￿rst (R&D) stage.
￿ In option TSC, collaboration is restricted to the (complete) spillover
of knowledge; R&D decisions remain independent. Assets levels at the
subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game corresponding to
the Technology Sharing Cartel, aT






i [a1,a 2] − (s/2)a
2
i, ∀i =1 ,2.
￿ On the other hand, in option RDC, ￿rms coordinate their R&D de-
cisions so as to maximize the sum of their combined pro￿ts. That is,
equilibrium assets levels corresponding to the R&D Cartel, aR













3.2 Joint production of the new good (PJV, CJV, IJV)
Here, the parent ￿rms form a new joint venture (labelled 3) which is respon-
sible for the production of good Z. The three options share thus the same
second stage where each of the three ￿rms chooses the pro￿t maximizing
level of the good it produces. That is, ￿rms 1 to 3 respectively face the
10following maximization programs (where superscript L is either equal to P,














3 [x,y,z,a1,a 2]=[ r − (c − a1 − a2)]z
=[ β + a1 + a2 − z − γ (x + y)]z.
Solving for the system of three ￿rst-order conditions, one derives the
output equilibria for any given levels of the assets a1 and a2.A sa b o v e ,u s i n g
these output equilibria, we can write the second stage equilibrium gross pro￿t










L(a1,a 2),a 1,a 2
⁄
.
Diﬀerences appear between the three options regarding ￿rst stage R&D
decisions.
￿ In option PJV, the parent ￿rms independently choose their R&D in-
vestment to maximize their own pro￿ts, i.e., the pro￿ts they realize
on the production of their old good (X or Y ), augmented by half of
￿rm 3￿s pro￿ts.8 Assets levels at the subgame perfect equilibrium of
the two-stage game corresponding to the Production Joint Venture, aP
i ,





i [a1,a 2]+( 1 /2)Π
P
3 [a1,a 2] − (s/2)a
2
i ∀i =1 ,2.
￿ In option CJV, ￿rms coordinate their R&D decisions so as to maximize
the sum of their combined pro￿ts (i.e., total industry pro￿ts). That is,
equilibrium assets levels corresponding to the Cooperative Joint Ven-
ture, aC














8At this stage, we need to make a speci￿c assumption about the division of the joint
venture￿s pro￿ts between the two parents. Because parent ￿rms are symmetric, equal
splitting appears as a reasonable assumption.
11￿ In option IJV, ￿rm 3 is fully independent insofar as it is not only
responsible for the production of good Z but also for the choice of
speci￿c assets (and it bears therefore the cost of these assets). As a
result, ￿rm 3 is the only active ￿rm at the ￿rst stage of the game and












3.3 Joint production of all goods (MER)
In the Merger option, the parent ￿rms merge to form a single entity (noted
m). At the second stage of the game, this ￿rm chooses the pro￿t maximizing





m [x,y,z,a1,a 2]=( β − x − γz)x +( β − y − γz)y
+[β + a1 + a2 − z − γ (x + y)]z.
Solving for the system of three ￿rst-order conditions, one derives the output
equilibria for any given levels of the assets a1 and a2; using these output











M(a1,a 2),a 1,a 2
⁄
.
At the ￿rst stage, the merged ￿rm chooses the pro￿t maximizing levels
of the speci￿ca s s e t s ,aM










3.4 Synthesis of results
We need to impose some conditions on the parameters to ensure that the
second order conditions are satis￿ed and that all the endogenous variables
(assets, costs, quantities) are positive at equilibrium in every option. Tedious
but straightforward computations yield the following set of conditions:










12In words, the degree of diﬀerentiation between the new good and the old
goods must be high enough (i.e., cannibalization cannot be too strong), and
investment in R&D must be costly enough. More speci￿cally, condition (C1)
makes sure that R&D levels are nonnegative when they are the lowest, i.e.,
in option TSC. The ￿rst part of condition (C2) guarantees that marginal
cost for the new good is nonnegative when R&D levels are the highest, i.e.,
in option IJV; the second part of condition (C2) ensures that nonnegative
quantities of old goods are produced in the worst-case scenario for them, i.e.,
in the merger option.
We present in Appendix 6.1 the perfect equilibrium levels of industry
assets and of output for the three goods in the six options. We also indicate
how these results can be used to derive ￿rms￿ pro￿ts, consumers surplus and
social welfare.
4 Welfare analysis
As mentioned above, because the new product is a substitute for the old ones
(i.e., for γ > 0), the sales it generates come at their expense (cannibalization
eﬀect). In such a context, R&D activities not only aﬀect the production
of good Z but also the production of good X and Y : other things equal,
the higher are the industry R&D eﬀorts and the degree of product substi-
tutability, the higher will be the value of the sale lost on old goods. This
introduces two major changes with respect to what has been studied so far
in the literature (i.e., the case where γ =0 ): ￿rst, while incentives for R&D
are equivalent in options CJV, IJV and MER for γ =0 , they clearly diﬀer
for γ > 0; second, one must now check whether the ￿rms￿ participation con-
straint is met (i.e., whether the revenue generated by the new good outweighs
the revenue lost on the old good plus the cost of R&D expenditures).
More practically, the introduction of cannibalization also makes the anal-
ysis much more cumbersome: there are six (instead of four) options to com-
pare, for all admissible combinations of two (instead of one) key parameters￿
the cost of R&D (s) and the degree of product substitutability (γ). In con-
sequence, we will not try to exhaustively rank the six options in terms of
industry pro￿ts, consumers surplus, and social welfare; even though this
task is technically feasible, it will become clear below that some comparisons
are of a very limited interest. We focus instead on the most signi￿cant re-
sults and address the following questions: Given R&D costs and the degree of
13product substitutability, which option yields the highest welfare level? Do the
interests of ￿rms and consumers diverge or converge for such option? Does
the market provide the ￿rms with the correct incentives to engage in such
option? We proceed step by step, by comparing ￿rst the options sharing
some common features. Note that we take the point of view of a second-best
regulator who can permit or refuse cooperative arrangements between ￿rms
but who cannot interfere with their production and R&D decisions.
4.1 Cooperative vs. non-cooperative R&D
A ￿rst set of results concerns the two options where there is no cooperation
in R&D activities. Simple computations (based on the results presented in
Appendix A) show that over the whole admissible range of parameters, the
Technology Sharing Cartel is dominated by the R&D Cartel, both in terms
of industry pro￿ts and of consumers surplus. This means that the result of
d￿Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) carries over in the presence of cannibal-
ization. It is worth noting, however, that the positive diﬀerences in ￿rms￿
pro￿ts, in consumers surplus, and in total welfare between options RDC and
TSC decrease with the degree of product substitutability; at the limit, for
γ =0 .477 (where R&D eﬀorts approach zero in option TSC), the diﬀerences
vanish.
In a similar way, it can be shown that the Production Joint Venture is
dominated by the Cooperative Joint Venture both in terms of industry pro￿ts
and of consumers surplus. Note that, as in the previous ￿nding, the diﬀerence
between the two options decreases (but does not vanish at the limit) as γ
increases (i.e., as the cannibalization eﬀect becomes stronger).
Collecting the previous results, we can state the following proposition.9
Proposition 1 None of the options involving uncoordinated R&D activites
(i.e., options TSC and PJV) would ever be chosen either by the ￿rms or by
a second-best regulator.
9The proofs of the following propositions require tedious but straightforward computa-
tions based on the results of Table 2; they are omitted here but can be found in a technical
appendix available from the author.
144.2 Socially desirable way to coordinate production
Besides option PJV which is Pareto-dominated, three other options involve
some form of cooperation in production decisions: options CJV, IJV, and
MER. As noted above, these options, which provide the same incentives for
R&D when γ =0 , must be clearly distinguished when γ > 0. Because op-
tions CJV and IJV share the same production stage (they both involve the
set up of a joint venture), their comparison leads to clear cut results. In par-
ticular, it can be shown that the Independent Joint Venture is socially more
desirable than the Cooperative Joint Venture, but there exists a divergence be-
tween consumers surplus (higher in the Independent JV) and industry pro￿ts
(higher in the Cooperative JV). Intuitively, the divergence comes from the
type of R&D cooperation that takes place in the two options: in the Coop-
erative JV, assets are chosen so as to maximize industry pro￿ts, which are
therefore higher; on the other hand, the Independent JV chooses assets so as
to maximize pro￿ts over the production of good Z, which leads to a higher
consumers surplus.
Next, it turns out that a similar result holds for the comparison between
options IJV and MER: despite the fact that the Merger option leads to higher
industry pro￿ts, the Independent Joint Venture is socially more desirable than
the Merger because of a higher consumers surplus.
Finally, the comparison between options CJV and MER is ambiguous;
we have that ΠM > ΠC for all s and γ, but the ranking in terms of con-
sumers surplus and of social welfare depends on the speci￿cv a l u e so fγ and
s: roughly speaking, one can say that the Cooperative Joint Venture yields
higher consumers surplus and social welfare than a complete merger unless
R&D costs are very low.10
The main ￿nding that can be drawn from the previous results is thus the
following: when production decisions are coordinated in one way or another,
it is socially desirable to let R&D eﬀorts be chosen by the independent joint
venture, so as to maximize its own pro￿t. In other words, when the produc-
tion of the new good is conducted by a single ￿rm, it is welfare-enhancing
to link coordinated R&D eﬀorts solely to the production of the new good,
10For instance, for γ =0 .1 (and provided that s
ﬂ
(γ)=( 1− γ)−1), we have the following
ranking: (i) for s
ﬂ
(0.1) = 1.111 ≤ s<1.209,S C <S M and WC <W M;f o r1.209 ≤ s<
1.226,S C >S M and WC <W M;f o rs ≥ 1.226, SC >S M and WC >W M.T h ev a r i o u s
threshold values are increasing in γ (e.g., for γ =0 .4, the corresponding threshold values
are respectively 1.667,1.720, and 1.757).
15leaving thus aside all consideration about cannibalization prospects. This
result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Among the four options involving cooperation in production
decisions (i.e., options PJV, CJV, IJV, and MER), the Independent Joint
Venture leads to the highest consumers surplus and social welfare.
4.3 Firms￿ incentives
A ￿rst intuitive result about ￿rms￿ incentives is that industry pro￿ts are
higher in the Merger option than in any other option. This is not a surprise
insofar as when the ￿rms completely merge, they internalize all externalities
and reach thus the highest possible pro￿ts. From the above results, we also
know that the second on the list is either option CJV or option RDC; simple
computations reveal that the Cooperative Joint Venture yields the second
highest industry pro￿ts provided that the degree of product substitutability
and R&D costs are not too high; otherwise, the R&D Cartel does.11 However,
it can also be shown that for those values of γ and s where ΠR > ΠC, it is
also true that ΠR < Π0, meaning that the participation constraint is not
met.
As far as the participation constraint is concerned, it is easy to show
that in all options but the Merger option, one can ￿nd, for suﬃciently high
values of γ,v a l u e so fs for which the participation constraint is violated
(see Appendix 6.2 for a formal statement). Intuitively, as the degree of
cannibalization and research costs increase, introduction of the new product
b e c o m e sl e s sp r o ￿table.
The next proposition collects the previous results and review the situation
about ￿rms￿ incentives.
Proposition 3 By completely merging, the ￿rms achieve the highest pro￿ts
among the six options and always improve upon initial pro￿ts (i.e., absent
the new good). If complete merger is not allowed, ￿rms will prefer to form
a Cooperative Joint Venture, but they might end up with lower pro￿ts than
in the initial situation if the degree of product substitutability and R&D costs
are beyond some threshold.
11More precisely, ΠC > ΠR unless γ > 0.404 and s>￿ s(γ),w i t h￿ s0(γ) < 0 (and with,
e.g., ￿ s(0.405) = 122.634, ￿ s(0.425) = 7.955, ￿ s(0.45) = 3.850, and ￿ s(0.475) = 2.578).
164.4 R&D Cartel or Independent Joint Venture, or ...?
Collecting the results from Propositions 1 and 2, we have already established
the following rankings in terms of consumer surplus and social welfare: the
R&D Cartel dominates the Technology Sharing Cartel, and the Independent
Joint Venture dominates the Cooperative and the Production Joint Ven-
tures, as well as the Merger. In other words, the highest social welfare and
consumers surplus levels will be reached under either option RDC or option
IJV. The remaining issues are thus the following. First, we must identify
the regions in the (γ,s) space where one option should be preferred over the
other, and where ￿rms￿ and consumers￿ interest converge or diverge. Next
question which arises naturally is whether the socially desirable option is
likely to be chosen by the ￿rms in the absence of public intervention. We
already know from Proposition 3 that the answer is no since options RDC
and IJV are both dominated in terms of pro￿ts by options MER and CJV.
We could then consider that antitrust authorities, acting as a second-best
regulator, would prohibit the formation of any merger or cooperative joint
venture. Yet, we also know that options RDC and IJV might violate the
participation constraint. We need thus to investigate what the authorities
should decide in such case (assuming that they cannot force ￿rms to engage
in unpro￿table agreements).
4.4.1 RDC vs. IJV
The answer to the ￿rst question is depicted in Figure 2 where the R&D
Cartel and the Independent Joint Venture are compared with respect to
industry pro￿ts, consumers surplus, and social welfare. It turns out that the
admissible range of the (γ,s) space has to be divided into four areas where
the following rankings obtain:12
￿ area 1 is characterized by ΠI > ΠR, SI <S R,a n dWI <W R;
￿ area 2 is characterized by ΠI > ΠR, SI <S R,a n dWI >W R;
￿ area 3 is characterized by ΠI > ΠR, SI >S R,a n dWI >W R;
￿ area 4 is characterized by ΠI < ΠR, SI >S R,a n dWI >W R.
12Only part of condition (C2) is represented in Figure 2, i.e., s>(1 − γ)
−1. The second
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Figure 2: Comparison between options RDC and IJV
In terms of social welfare, option RDC should be chosen only in area
1 (i.e., for values of γ no larger than 0.206 and for values of s suﬃciently
large); in the other three areas, social welfare is maximized under option
IJV.13 Regarding the comparison between ￿rms￿ and consumers￿ interests,
area 3 is the only region of parameters where ￿rms and consumers agree
(they all prefer option IJV); in the other three areas, interests diverge: in
areas 1 and 2, ￿rms prefer option IJV while consumers prefer option RDC;
the opposite prevails in area 4.
To understand the intuition behind these results, it is worth recalling that
options RDC and IJV diﬀer both at the production and at the R&D stages,
which induces a complex interplay of countervailing forces. At the production
stage, option RDC involves separate production of good Z by ￿rms 1 and 2
13It is important to note that in a large part of these three areas, option RDC is domi-
nated not only by option IJV but also by option CJV.
18while, in option IJV, it is a new independent ￿rm that is the single producer
of good Z.A si n d i c a t e da b o v e ,t h i sd i ﬀerence entails contrasting eﬀects:
on the one hand, ￿rms internalize the cannibalization eﬀect in option RDC
but not in option IJV; on the other hand, option RDC induces competition
on the new good market whereas option IJV does not. An increase in the
degree of product substitutability reinforces the former eﬀect (internalizing
the cannibalization eﬀect becomes more pro￿table) but does not aﬀect the
latter; therefore, for given R&D investements, the balance between the two
eﬀects is more favorable (in terms of social welfare) to option RDC as γ
increases.
At the R&D stage, levels of speci￿c assets are chosen so as to maximize
industry pro￿ts in option RDC, and the joint venture￿s pro￿ts only in option
IJV; the implications of this diﬀerence are best viewed by examining the ￿rst-
order conditions with respect to the level of speci￿ca s s e t sai (where account
i st a k e no ft h e￿rst-order conditions at the production stage, and of the fact

























































The marginal revenue of R&D can be decomposed into several parts in
both options. Two parts are common to both options: part I is the direct
positive eﬀect stemming from the decrease in good Z marginal cost of pro-
duction; part II is an indirect positive eﬀect stemming from the fact that
the production of the old goods is negatively aﬀe c t e db ya ni n c r e a s ei nR & D
eﬀorts, which in turn induces an increase in the price of good Z (up to γ).
Two additional negative eﬀects occur in option RDC: part III is an indirect
negative eﬀect stemming from the fact that the prices of the old goods de-
crease because of the increase in the production of good Z;p a r tI Vi sa n o t h e r
negative eﬀect caused by the competition on the market for good Z.O n e
understands thus that the Independent Joint Venture yields more intensive
R&D eﬀorts than the R&D Cartel.14 However, because production stages are
14As a matter of fact, it can be checked that option IJV yields the highest levels of
speci￿c assets among all six options.
19diﬀerent, higher R&D eﬀorts in option IJV need not translate in higher equi-
librium quantities of the new good; actually, for a given γ, zI >z R provided
that R&D costs do not exceed some threshold (that increases with γ).
4.4.2 Participation constraint
L e tu sn o wt u r nt ot h es e c o n di s s u ea n de x a m i n ew h i c ho p t i o nt h er e g u l a t o r
should select taking into account the ￿rms￿ participation constraint. To
organize our thoughts, let us ￿rst recall some useful ￿ndings drawn from the
previous analyses:
1. the participation constraint becomes stringent for the various options in
a region of parameters where option IJV leads to the highest consumers
surplus and social welfare;
2. one can show that in that region, option RDC is completely dominated
by option CJV;15
3. option CJV yields higher consumers surplus and social welfare than
option MER unless R&D costs are very low;
4. pro￿ts are higher in the Cooperative than in the Independent Joint
Venture over the whole range of parameters, meaning that the partic-
ipation constraint is violated for a larger range of parameters under
option IJV than under option CJV;
5. the Merger option always improves upon initial pro￿ts.
A c c o r d i n gt ot h el a s tt w o￿ndings, the area of (γ,s) space where the
participation constraint is violated under option IJV must be further divided
into two zones: a ￿rst zone where option CJV meets the constraint and a
second zone (corresponding to larger values of γ for a given s)w h e r ei td o e s
not. Using the other three ￿ndings, it is clear that, in the second zone, the
regulator can choose nothing but the Merger option, while, in the ￿rst zone,
she can choose between options CJV and MER and we know that option
CJV should be preferred unless s is very close to its minimum admissible
value.
15Suﬃcient conditions to have WI >W C >W R and SI >S C >S R are, respectively,
γ >. 206 and γ >. 273; on the other hand, a necessary condition to have ΠL < Π0 (L =
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Figure 3: Solution to the constrained welfare maximization program
We are now in a position to identify, in the whole admissible range of pa-
rameters, which option leads to the highest welfare level while satisfying the
￿rms￿ participation constraint. The solution is summarized in the following
proposition and ￿gure.
Proposition 4 The regulator￿s welfare maximizing choice between the six
options under the ￿rms￿ participation constraint depends on the values of
t h ed e g r e eo fc a n n i b a l i z a t i o n( γ) and of the costs of R&D (s)a sd e p i c t e di n
Figure 3.
4.5 Social desirability of the new product
The previous proposition indicates which of the six options the regulator
should prefer under the constraint that she cannot force ￿rms to enter into
unpro￿table agreements. In particular, it shows that when cannibalization is
21particularly strong, the complete merger is the only pro￿table agreement, and
it should thus be preferred despite its low welfare performance. However, for
the merger to be permitted, it still needs to pass a ￿nal test: it must improve
social welfare on the level W0 that would be achieved were the new product
not introduced (and no R&D carried out).













which is satis￿ed since, from condition (C2), s>1/(1−γ), and from condition
(C1), γ <. 477 implies that 1/(1 − γ) > 2/[3(1 − 2γ2)].
We have thus shown that the creation of the new good is socially desirable
for the whole admissible range of parameters (meaning that even when the
￿rms￿ participation constraint is violated, the increase in consumer surplus
outweighs the pro￿ts lost by the ￿rms). The following proposition records
this result (which partly follows from the love for variety that the consumers￿
utility function exhibits).
Proposition 5 In a context where the creation of a new product involves
R&D investments by two parent ￿rms whose existing products are substitute
to the new one, complete merger between the parents should be permitted
when cannibalization is strong and research costs are high: the introduction
of the new product is indeed socially desirable, and the merger is the sole
arrangement under which the ￿rms will ￿nd it pro￿table to introduce it.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Over the last two decades, an abundant literature has investigated the private
and social incentives for cooperation in Research and Development (R&D)
eﬀorts between oligopolistic ￿rms. The primary bene￿ts and disadvantages
of R&D cooperation have been shown to depend mainly on the degree of
knowledge spillover between the ￿rms and on the costs of R&D activities.
For instance, it is established that when spillovers are suﬃciently large, coop-
eration in R&D (with subsequent competition at the output stage) is welfare-
improving.
22In this literature, the production stage concerns some isolated good mar-
ket; that is, R&D activities allow to discover or to reduce the production costs
of some new good which is assumed to be independent of any other good the
participating ￿rms could already be producing. In many situations, however,
such assumption seems rather restrictive. For instance, the current process
of ￿digital convergence￿￿i.e., the coming together of the telecommunications,
information technology and audio-visual sectors￿gives rise to new products
that combine the characteristics of existing products and thereby appear as
substitutes for these existing products. As a consequence, the introduction of
such new products come at the expense of the sales of existing ￿old￿ products,
a phenomenon known as cannibalization. In such a context, R&D activities
directed towards the production of new goods have to be appreciated for
their eﬀects not only on the market for these goods, but also on the markets
for old goods.
The aim of present paper was to re-assess the issue of cooperation in
R&D by taking cannibalization into account. In a context where the ￿rms
can choose between a set of various options to collaborate in R&D and/or
in the production of a new product, we established the following results
(assuming that spillovers are complete).
1. None of the options involving uncoordinated R&D activities would ever
be chosen either by the ￿rms or by a regulator willing to maximize social
welfare.
2. When cannibalization is not too strong, the welfare-maximizing collab-
orative agreement between parent ￿rms is of the following form. In
case of low R&D costs, ￿rms should form a separate entity that inde-
pendently chooses the output level of the new good, and the level of
R&D expenditures. Otherwise, they should jointly decide about R&D,
but independently about production.
3. When cannibalization is strong, ￿rms might ￿nd it unpro￿table to mar-
ket the new good unless they are allowed to narrowly collaborate with
each other (on R&D and on production). At the limit, a complete
merger will be the only option under which the new good will appear.
Merger should then be permitted by the regulator since it proves to en-
hance social welfare with respect to the situation where the new good
is not introduced.
23The latter result is of particular interest for antitrust matters. It im-
plies indeed that in the presence of strong cannibalization, mergers could be
a necessary evil for the socially desirable introduction of new goods. The
modeling framework used in this paper is, however, too speci￿ct oe l a b o r a t e
further on this issue.
Several extensions can be suggested to complement the present analysis.
￿ A ￿rst way to extend the present analysis would be to introduce un-
certainty with respect to the size of the market for the new good. In
our model, market size can be measured by the diﬀerence between α
(intercept of the inverse demand curve) and c (marginal cost of produc-
tion). For the sake of simplicity we have assumed that this diﬀerence
is the same for all goods before any process innovation. However, it
would be more realistic to consider that market sizes for old and new
products diﬀer, and that ￿rms are uncertain about the magnitude of
this diﬀerence. Such uncertainty is likely to aﬀect ￿rms￿ incentives to
internalize the cannibalization eﬀect, and thereby to modify our results
with respect to the choice of collaborative agreements.
￿ A second extension would be to allow for competition on the market
for the new product. Such extension is of primary importance to anal-
yse antitrust issues. In the present analysis, in order to focus on the
cannibalization issue, we assumed that the parent ￿rms were the only
active ￿rms on the market for the new product, and that there was no
threat of entry. If this assumption is relaxed, R&D eﬀorts have also to
be seen as a way of gaining market shares over incumbent ￿rms or of
preventing entry (because of the cost reduction impact of R&D). Bres-
nahan and Salop (1986) and Reynolds and Snapp (1986) explore the
competitive eﬀects of production joint ventures, but leave aside R&D.
￿ Finally, a third￿and, in our view, more challenging￿extension would
consist in considering cooperation between asymmetric ￿rms. We as-
sumed here that the introduction of the new good aﬀects the demand
f o rt h et w oe x i s t i n gg o o d si nas y m m e t r i cw a y .I tm i g h th o w e v e rb et h e
case that one of the parent ￿rms suﬀers more from the creation of the
new good than the other parent.16 A number of important questions
16F o ri n s t a n c e ,t h ec r e a t i o no f￿ You￿ve got Pictures! ￿ i sl i k e l yt od om o r eh a r mt o
Kodak￿s core business than to AOL￿s.
24then arise with respect to the ownership and governance structures of
the joint venture. Veugelers and Kesteloot (1996), Petit and Tolwin-
ski (1999), and Belle￿amme and Bloch (2000) consider joint ventures
among asymmetric partners, but under diﬀerent perspectives than the
one envisioned here.
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6 Appendices
6.1 Equilibrium of the six two-stage games
Table 2 presents the perfect equilibrium levels of industry assets and of output
for the three goods in the six options.17
Using the ￿rst-order conditions for pro￿t maximization at the production
stage, one can easily express industry pro￿ts corresponding to the various
options as follows (where variables are evaluated at their perfect equilibrium
level).













2)( K = T,R).










2)( L = P,C,I).
17 Note that β = α−c should appear as a multiplying factor in every cell of Table 2; to
simplify the exposition, we arbitrarily set β to unity; this assumption does not harm the
welfare analysis since it only deals with comparisons between the diﬀerent options (where
the common factor β inevitably cancels out). Note also that because of the symmetry of
the models, the equilibrium levels of X and Y are equal.
26Table 2: Synthesis of perfect equilibrium asset and ouput levels

































































As far as the consumers surplus is concerned, it is readily computed
by combining expressions (1) and (2), yielding the same formulation for all
options:
S





2)+γ(x + y)z (K = T,R,P,C,I,M).





K (K = T,R,P,C,I,M).
6.2 Participation constraint
Regarding the ￿rms￿ participation constraint, simple computations show that
in all options but the Merger option, one can ￿nd, for suﬃciently high values
27of γ,v a l u e so fs for which the participation constraint is violated.We state
here the relevant conditions for options RDC, CJV and IJV. That is, in
options RDC, CJV and IJV, industry pro￿ts are lower than initial pro￿ts if
the following conditions hold:
-o p t i o nR D C ,γ > 0.351 and s>
8γ2
(2 − 3γ)(−8+2 4 γ +6 γ2 − 27γ3)
;
-o p t i o nC J V ,γ > 0.363 and s>
2γ2
−2+8 γ − 7γ2 + γ4;
-o p t i o nI J V ,γ > 0.363 and s>
8(1− 3γ + γ3)
(2 − 3γ2)
2 (2 − 6γ + γ2 + γ3)
.
28